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THE USE OF THE TRUST TO ESCAPE TIH

IMPOSITION OF FEDERAL INCOME
AND ESTATE TAXES
C. W. LEAPHART*

Throughout the history of the trust and its predecessor, the Use,
an important employment of the trust device has been that of escaping burdens imposed by law.'
Income and estate taxes are not the least unpleasant of these. Naturally the trust, long a handy device for getting out of difficulties,
has been and is being used for the purpose of avoiding these statutes.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the possibilities of the device
with reference to federal income and estate taxes. Further, it is not
the purpose to deal with illegal employment of the trust. If tax laws
cover trusts and a secret trust is made in orde to avoid the taxes, such
a trust would seemingly be properly classified as illegal. This paper
will deal with the open and aboveboard use of the trust in order to escape the imposition of the taxes. In other words, the grantor is seek2
ing to avail "himself to the full of what the law permits."
In connection with the subject of taxation it is frequently reiterated
that "such statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the
clear import of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the
doubt must be resolved against the government and in favor of the
taxpayer." 3 This has to an extent helped those seeking to escape tax
burdens by means of the device. However, the practice of the Supreme
Court of the United States is to construe the trust sections liberally and it is generally when the constitutionality of the measure is
4
in question that the doctrine of strict construction is mentioned.
The attitude taken by the Vermont court in In re Fulham's Estate,
seems justifiable and it is believed in reality represents the attitude of
the Federal Court. It is set forth in the following language:'
*Dean of the University of Montana Law School.
'For example see Scott, The Trust as an Instrument of Law Reform (1921) 31
YALE L. J. 457.
2
Justice Holmes in Bullen v. State of Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct.
473 (1916).
3
Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153,38 Sup. Ct. 53,54 (1917); U. S. v. Merriam,

263 U. S. 179, 188, 44 Sup. Ct. 69, 71 (1923); Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278
U. S. 339, 349, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 125 (1929).
4

See cases supra note 3. Also see Irwin v. Gavitt, 268 U. S. 161, 166, 45 Sup.

Ct. 475 (1925).
196 Vermont 3o8, 314, 119 AtI. 433, 435 (1923).

6!bid. For Supreme Court case see Bowers v. New York and Albany Lighterage
-Co., 273 U. S. 346, 47 Sup. Ct. 389 (1926).
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"It is quite generally held that taxing statutes are to be
strictly construed against the taxing power, and this rule is applied to statutes providing for inheritance taxes. But the real
meaning and purpose of the law giver is the thing to be sought
after, and if fair and reasonable construction discloses it, it
is to be given effect. Then, too, we must remember that the
section under consideration is not the one that provides for
taxing inheritances, direct or collateral, but the one intended
to prevent evasion of such taxes. The very purpose of its
enactment was to make it impossible to escape such taxes by transfers merely colorable or fictitious. The policy of such statutesnow in force in many of the states-is that the owner of property
shall not evade the tax except by full and effective transfers
made during his lifetime. State Street Trust Company v. Stevens,
209 Mass. 375, 95 N.E. 851. Surely such a statute should be
carefully considered and liberally construed in favor of the taxing power (In re Gordon, 186 N.Y. 471, 79 N.E. 722, io L.R.A.
(N.S.) io89), lest its purpose be easily circumvented by designing persons. For a construction that would facilitate evasion
should be avoided."
From an examination of the cases it is impossible to determine to
what extent the trust has been used in order to evade taxes. They simply show that the parties are seeking to evade the tax by reason of the
fact that there is a trust. It is equally impossible to determine to what
extent the present popularity of the trust is due to the idea which prevails or has prevailed in the past that these two classes of taxes may be
minimized or wholly escaped by means of it. The great growth of the
trust to a certain extent coincident with the widespread imposition
of these taxes7 may shed a little light upon the question but even then
there are many other factors that have to be taken into consideration.
The fact that Congress has. steadily closed the avenue of escape by
means of the trust indicates, however, that the Revenue Department
has been aware that incomes and estates were escaping taxes by that
means. That the Treasury Department thinks that the trust is being
deliberately used is shown by the statement of the changes made in
the Revenue Act of 1921 by the Treasury Draft and Reasons Therefore,s
in which appears the following: (I) "The creation of a revocable
trust constitutes nothing but an assignment of the right to receive
future income and the income of such a trust should be included in the
income of the grantor;" (2) "Trusts have been used to evade taxes by
means of provisions allowing the distribution of the income to the
7

Smm, TRUST COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1928) 373, says that trust

deposits in trust companies had in the State of Pennsylvania alone increased from
$496,ooo,ooo in 1907 to $4,o67,000,000 in 1927.
8

Prepared by A. W. Gregg, subsequently Solicitor of Internal Revenue, at page

44.
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grantor or its use for his benefit.. The purpose of this sub-division of
the draft is to stop this evasion." "The explanation of their purposes
in the committee reports is substantially that quoted."
No attempt will be made to show to what extent the suspicions of
Congress and the Treasury are justified. The attempt will be to determine to what extent property already in trust may escape federal
income and estates taxes and to what extent individuals as distinct
0
from business trusts may escape these taxes by future creations."
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX ON PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS

There are at least three types of cases where it has been thought
that the federal income tax of private individuals could be minimized
or avoided by use of the trust.
i. The income could be minimized by avoiding the progressive rate
of surtaxes in the following manner: A person who is spending, let us
say, 85o,ooo a year on his family of five might declare himself a trus-

tee of the property which is
the five reserving to himself
ment, etc. of the trust funds
the trust. The tax payable

producing that income for the benefit of
wide powers in the investment, manageand the power to alter, amend, or revoke
upon the income of $io,ooo each for the

five beneficiaries would be less than on a lump income of $50,000, un-

less the whole is to be taxed to the trustee.
Property which has greatly appreciated in value, since it was
2.
first acquired could be put in trust for members of the family and
then sold and so escape the tax on the great appreciation in value.
In other words, shares of stock are acquired for Sioo,ooo, when they
reach 83oo,ooo they are put in trust by a father for his daughter. Six
weeks later they are sold by the trustee for $325,ooo. The expectation
was that the tax would fall on 825,ooo appreciation and not on
$225,000.

3. The funded insurance trust could be used to minimize the income tax and also to escape the inheritance tax in the following manner. The insured having made a policy payable to a beneficiary settles property on trust, with the provision that the income be used as
far as necessary to pay the premiums on the policy and that on the
settlor's death the principal of the trust fund and any accumulations
be paid to the beneficiary. The insured reserves the right to change
the beneficiary and also the right to alter, amend, or revoke the trust.
It is clear that no income from this fund would be payable to the insured unless the trust were revoked.
-

Magill, The Taxation of Unrealized Income (1925) 39 HARv. L. REV. 82, 98.
'0The use of the trust in business enterprises to escape income as well as other
corporation taxes furnishes ample material for a separate article.
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The possibilities of minimizing the tax by avoiding progressive rate
of surtaxes in the manner suggested in (i) appears by reason of additions to the Income Tax Act of 191311 and decisions thereunder to
be very limited. Important additions were (g) and (h) to Section
2i9 of the Revenue Act of 192412 which read as follows:
"(g) When the grantor of a trust has, at any time during the
taxable year, either alone or in conjunction with any person not
a beneficiary of the trust, the power to revest in himself title to
any part of the corpus of the trust, then the income of such part
of the trust for such taxable year shall be included in computing
the net income of the grantor.
"(h) Where any part of the income of a trust may, in the discretion of the grantor of the trust, either alone or in conjunction
with any person not a beneficiary of the trust, be distributed to
the grantor or be held~or accumulated for future distribution to
him, or where any part 0f the income of a trust is or may be applied
to the payment of premiums upon policies of insurance on
the life of the grantor (except policies of insurance irrevocably
payable for the purposes and in the manner specified in paragraph (io) of subdivision (a) of section 214), such part of the
income of the trust shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor."
Those sections have been substantially unchanged in subsequent
acts. 13

Granting that 219 (g) and (h) are constitutional, a certain minimizing is possible if the grantor is willing to reserve no beneficial
interest in himself and no power to alter, amend, or revoke the trust
except in conjunction with a beneficiary. By making himself trustee,
of a trust for the support, education, etc. of his family with wide
powers of management, as Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company4 indicates is permissible, he may still continue to manage the property as
of old; The income will be taxable to him now, however, as the fiduciary. In that event because of the relatively smaller income of the
beneficiaries and the progressive rate of the surtaxes a minimizing
will be accomplished.
Mr. Magill points out opportunities for circumventing those sections of the statute in the following extract€'
"In the first place it will be noted that the effectiveness of
these provisions is very-much restricted by the requirement that
the grantor possess the power alone or in conjunction with a person not a beneficiary of the trust. "If the grantor is willing to
1138 STAT. 166 et seq. (r913).
'243 STAT. 276, 277 (1924).
34 (1926); 45 STAT. 849 (1928).
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 3, at 346, 49 Sup. Ct. at
15Magill, loc. cit. supra note 9.
'344 STAT.

14

125.
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exercise the power in conjunction with a beneficiary, that is if
he can find any such person whom he can trust to join him in
exercising the power as he may desire, he can completely circumvent the statutory provisions. Again, Treasury Regulations
65 provide in Article 347, that if the grantor relinquished the
power of revocation during the taxable year, the income of the
trust shall be taxable to him only for the period during which
he had the power. A logical corollary of this proposition would
be that if the grantor had the power for only part of the year,
then the income should be taxable to him for only such part.
So to hold, however, would be to fly in the face of the words of
the subdivision. Finally, it would seem that the effect of subdivision (g) at least could be avoided by the creation of an irrevocable trust for a brief period, which would very possibly
serve the same purpose as a trust with a power of revocation."
The same provisions appear in Treasury Regulations 74, Article 88i.
Professor Magill's remarks are still pertinent.
Mr. Magill points out that there is a reasonable doubt as to their
constitutionality in the following:"5a
"The final question is whether, assuming that the present
provisions are not wholly effective, they are nevertheless valid.
The subdivisions apparently apply to trusts created long before
the passage of the act, when tax evasion could not have been
considered. But even if the statute were applicable only to
trusts created after its enactment, and was enacted solely to
prevent escape from the tax, it is a commonplace that Congress
cannot constitutionally designate some amount as income to an
individual, unless it is such in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
It may be granted, perhaps, -that the income of a trust used to
pay premiums on the grantor's life insurance policies may properly be taxed to the grantor, on the theories already discussed.
In most cases, the fact would probably be that an obligation of
the grantor was thereby being discharged. Again if the income of
the trust is, at the grantor's orders, distributed to him or accumulated for future distribution to him there seems to be no
difficulty in taxing it to him. But suppose that the grantor has
a mere power to revest in himself title to a part of the corpus
of the trust which he does not exercise; and that, accordingly,
the income of that part of the trust is paid to X, pursuant to
the terms of the trust deed. It is well settled that the validity
of a trust is not affected by the fact that it contains a power of
revocation.
In the absence of an actual revocation, such a
trust is enforceable by the beneficiary. Since revocable trusts
were a well-recognized and perfectly legal device long before
the adoption of the revenue acts, they can hardly be disregarded
for tax purposes. The fact that a power is reserved by the grantor whereby he may revest in himself theincome for 1926 and following years is scarcely a conclusive showing that the 1925 in15aIbid.
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come, actually paid to X, pursuant to the deed, belongs to the
grantor. Granted that the creator of the trust might have had
the 1925 income himself had he so chosen, he did not so choose,
and it is difficult to find a satisfactory theory for substituting
the Congressional volition for his."
Since Mr. Magill's article was published the Supreme Court of the
United States has treated the corpus of such a trust for the purpose of
the Estate Tax as property of the grantors. 16 Due to the different
nature of the estate tax and the income tax it does not necessarily
follow that that court will treat the income actually paid over to the
beneficiary as income of the trustor for income purposes. Such treatment seems justifiable, however. The" District Court in the southern
17
district of New York passed upon the question in Corliss v. Bowers.
It held that the sections were constitutional as to a tax which had
been levied in the same year in which the statute was passed upon income which had been paid in that year to the beneficiary of a trust
created prior to the act. The judgment was affirmed in the Circuit
Coirt. 1 The plaintiff created the trust in 1922 making the income for
life payable to his wife with remainders over for his children reserving
control over investment and the power "to alter in any manner, or
Income amounting to $124,352.97 was

revoke in whole or in part."

paid over to his wife in 1924 and plaintiff was assessed $44,687.43 in
respect to it, which he paid under protest and sought to recover. The
court granted the motion to dismiss the complaint. It relied upon the
fact that the sections were designed to prevent evasions of the income
tax laws. The pertinent -section of the opinion in the lower court on
this point reads as follows :18a

"It is abundantly clear from its legislative history that Congress passed the 1924 statute in order to prevent taxpayers
from evading the surtaxes. The progressive rate is one of the
vital features of the present system of income taxation. If
income-producing estates could be parceled out among donees
having incomes, in such a way that the donor paid no tax, although he retained full powers of control and recapture, the
surtax would be deprived of efficacy, and the income tax thereby greatly limited, despite the fact that a tax at the basic rate
would still be collectible."
It is submitted that the court is sound in its conclusion that Congress
is within the limits of its power to "prevent evasion and give practical
effect to the exercise of its admitted power." The same result should
16Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supranote 3.
173o F. (2d) 135 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
1834

F.

(2d) 656 (C. C. A.

2d,

1929).

1

1aSupranote

17, at 136.
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perhaps be reached when the power of revocation is reserved in conjunction with a trustee although here the grantor's power of control
is not so unlimited.
It appears probable that the grantor can safely use the device suggested in (x) only when he is willing to forego the power of revocation
except that he may reserve it in conjunction with a beneficiary.
The second suggested bit of evasion has been blocked by statutory
provisions. The section now appears in the Revenue Act of 1928 in
Section ix3 as follows:
"Transfer in Trust after December 31, 1920.-If the property
was acquired after December 31, 192o, by a transfer in trust
(either by a transfer in trust by a bequest or devise) the basis
shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the grantor, increased in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of
loss recognized to the grantor upon such transfer under the
law applicable to the year in which the transfer was made ......
The preceding section covering gifts is as follows:
"Gift after December 31, 192o.-If the property was acquired
by gift after December 31, 1920, the basis shall be the same as
it would be in the hands of the donor or the last preceding owner
by whom it was not acquired by gift. If the facts necessary to
determine such basis aie unknown to the donee, the Commissioner shall, if possible, obtain such facts from such donor or
last preceding owner, or any other person cognizant thereof.
If the Commissioner finds it impossible to obtain such facts,
the basis shall be the fair market value of such property
as found by the Commissioner as of the date or approximate date at which according to the best information that the
Conissioner is able to obtain, such property was acquired by
such donor or last preceding owner."
In the absence of such provisions the grantor might deprive the
government of revenue whenever property had considerably increased
in value by transferring on trust for the benefit of members of his family or making an outright gift to them.
The Supreme Court in two cases19 decided February 18, 1929, has
sustained the validity of these provisions as applied to outright gifts,
applying the Revenue Act of 1921, Section 2o2a,2. 20 The Court says
in substance that the donor could not by giving to his daughter property worth $3ooo which he had bought for Siooo deprive the sovereign
of taxing the appreciation when actually severed and convert the entire property into a capital asset of the donee as though the latter had
purchased at the market price. In truth the stock represented only
19Taft v. Bowers: Gilbert Greenway v. Bowers, 278 U. S. 470, 49 Sup. Ct. 199
(1929).

20

42 STAT. 227, 229, 237 (1921).
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a single investment of capital, that made by the donor. "She accepted the gift with knowledge of the statute and voluntarily assumed
the position of the donor. When she sold she got the original amount
invested plus the entire appreciation and out of the latter was called
on to pay only the tax demanded. Congress did not act arbitrarily
in requiring the donee to take the donor's position." It would seem
that the same result must be reached in the use of the trust for the
same reasoning applies.
same
Thepurpose.
chances ofThe
minimizing the income tax by means of the funded
insurance trust, the third method, are slimmer than by the first
method. That portion of 219h reading as follows: 2' "[Or] where any
part of the income of a trust is or may be applied to the payment of
premiums upon policies of insurance on the life of the grantor(except
policies of insurance irrevocably payable for the purpose and in the
manner specified in paragraph (io) of subdivision (a) of section 214)22
such part of the income of the trust shall be included in computing the
net income of the grantor"- expressly covers the attempted evasion
or minimizing of the tax. What was said in regard to Corliss v.
)3owersn is applicable here. Indeed, there is, if anything, less doubt
about the constitutionality of this section since the insured is with
24
this income discharging his own debt to the insurance company.
In accordance with the terminology of this portion the tax will lie
even though the trust is irrevocable.
Attention might be called to what appeared to be a gap in the income tax law of i9132 by reason of which one who left propeity by
will on trust the income to be paid to beneficiaries for life might avoid
for the beneficiaries during their lives the tax on this income. Section II B provided that the net income should include "gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever, including the income from, but not the value of, property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or descent." The contention was made in Irwin v. Gavit26
that where property was transferred to a trustee and only the income
was given to a beneficiary for a period which in the case would not exceed fifteen years, that the income itself was a bequest, and therefore
not subject to the tax. The Supreme Court decided against the taxpayer on what seems the fair construction of the pertinent section of
2
ISupra note 12.
22

The portion in parentheses refers to certain charitable purposes.
2aSupranote 17. See discussion on page 589.
24
For a contrary opinion see SHATTucK, TJiE LIVING TRUST (1928) 78.
2538 STAT. 114, I66 (1913).
26
Supra note 4.
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the act. Succeeding acts"7 have made it clearer that Congress did not
intend that these trusts should escape the income tax. 28
The possibilities of the use of the trust for escaping the operations
of the Federal income tax except as to business organizations seem
then limited to the narrow field set forth under the first type of cases
mentioned. If the grantor is content to transfer the beneficial interest
reserving no power of revocation other than the one in conjunction
with a beneficiary he may by making himself trustee with wide powers
of management, be able to use the income of the fund for his family's
benefit in substantially the same way that he would if he were the
unencumbered owner. Whether it would be fatal if he reserved the
power of revocation in himself alone or in conjunction with the trustee is not definitely settled, though it seems probable. By leaving
out the power of revocation entirely he can kill two birds with one
stone, minimizing the income and escaping the federal estate tax as
29
well, as we shall see later.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES

One can by means of a trust inter vivos get that which corresponds
closely to a'testamentary disposition of property and yet such a disposition is not testamentary.30 Even in conservative jurisdictions
by the use of the trust a person can, by reserving a life interest and
the power to revoke the trust in whole or in part, keep the enjoyment
and ultimate control of property during his life and it is not until his
death that the equitable remainderman will come into the enjoyment of the property in any substantial sense. Such a trust will be
valid and the instrument creating the trust will not have to comply
with the statute of wills.3 ' If estate or succession taxes could not be
levied at the death of the grantor upon'such trusts, it is evident that a
great opportunity would be presented for avoiding these taxes.
The Supreme Court has called attention to a possible distinction in
results between estate taxes and succession or inheritance taxes in
Saltonstall v. Saltonstal,12 indicating wider powers of taxation in the
756 (1916); 40 STAT. 300 (1917); 40 STAT. 1071 (1919); 42 STAT. 227
43 STAT. 275 (1924).
For two discussions of the case of Irwin v. Gavit, supra note 4, see (1923) 27
U. oF PA. L. REV. 413, 74 ibid. 182.
2"See infra pages 598, 5993
Leaphart, The Trust as a Substitutefor a Will (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 626.
3tJones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 3o9, 146 N. E. 76 (1925); Roche v.
Brickley, 254 Mass. 584, 15o N. E. 866 (1926); Allen v. Hendrick, 104 Ore. 202,
206 Pac. 733 (1922). For the extent to which the grantor may go, see Leaphart,
op. cit. supra note 30.
'2276 U. S. 26o, 48 Sup. Ct. 225 (1928).
2739 STAT.

(1921);
28
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case of the, succession tax which was the form of the Massachusetts
state tax involved in the case. The estate tax is a tax on the privilege
of transmitting,33 and the inheritance or succession tax upon the privilege of succession.4 They are both taxes upon shifting of the legal
interest at death.35 It is doubtful whether much more can be done by
means of the trust towards avoiding the estate tax than the succession
tax. The possible difference will be discussed later. 6
In considering how far estate taxes can be avoided by the use of the
trust, the first question that presents itself is, if the grantor creates a
trust reserving a life interest in himself, will the value of the property
in trust be included in estimating the value of the gross estate of the
grantor for purposes of the estate tax? In the absence of special provisions covering trusts it would seem not. The reservation of a life
estate does not make the disposition testamentary. 37 Prior to 1924
the taxing authorities relied on the following provisions of the Revenue Act.3 8
Sec. 402. "The value of the gross estate of the decedent
shall be determined by including the value at the time of his
death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible,
wherever situated(c) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer, or with respect of which he has
at any time created a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death (whether such
a transfer or trust is made or created before or after the passage
of this Act) ......
From a strictly technical point of view it could be said that the
estate took effect in possession and enjoyment at the time it was
created. 39 In one very important respect, at least, the estate vests in
enjoyment at the time of creation. The grantee can sell his interest
immediately. This power is, of course, valuable, and is one of the
rights of enjoyment of law as ordinarily understood. 0 The framers
of the statute were, however, aiming at evasions-and "the retention
33
Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61, 44 Sup. Ct. 293 (1924); Y. M. C. A. v.
Davis,
264 U. S. 47, 44 Sup. Ct. 291 (1924).
34
Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, supra note 32.

35Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747 (I9OO).
38
lnfra pages 6o2, 603.
37
1n addition to cases cited in ScoTT, CASES ON TRUSTS (1919) 215, n. I, see
McGillivray v. First Nat. Bank of Dickinson, 56 N. D. 152, 217 N. W. i5o
(1928); Nat. Newark and Essex Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq. 74, 128 At
586 (1925); Allen v. Hendrick, 1O4 Ore. 202, 206 Pac. 733 (1922).
3840 STAT. 1097 (1919)- Italics are the writers.
39
May v. Heiner, 25 F. (2d) 1004, IOO5 (W. D. Pa. 1928).
40(1916) 25 YALE

L. J. 602.
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by the grantor of a life interest in the property is so distinctly
a characteristic of possession or enjoyment of an estate as to be convincing evidence of an intent that the grant or the deed of trust is not
to take effect in enjoyment until the grantor's death.4 One would
expect the courts to consider these trusts within the statute. While
the Supreme Court of the United States has not passed upon the
question it has been the general view of the lower federal courts12 that
where the income for life is reserved for the grantor even though the
grantor has not reserved the right to revoke the trust, the conveyance is one intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or
after the death of the testator, and therefore is subject to the tax, and
where part of the income is retained by the settlor for his life, the
tax is imposed on a proportionate share.4 State courts have reached
the same conclusion with regard to similar provisions in state inheritance tax laws."
In Nichols v. Coolidge 5 it appears in the statement of facts that
Mr. and Mrs. Coolidge in 1907 transferred property on trust for themselves for life and on their death the property was to be distributed by
their trustees among their children. In 1917 the grantors assigned
their beneficial interest to their children. In 1921 Mrs. Coolidge
died. The Commissioners of Internal Revenue decided, that this
property must be included in the gross estate of the decedent in order
to determine the estate tax to be paid under the Revenue Act of
1919.48 The executor having paid the tax on this basis was allowed
to recover the excess payment. The Court was of the opinion that
47
was intended to apply retroactively but that so applied it
4 02C
was unconstitutional. The Court's objection was that Congress was
purporting in this act to levy a tax on the privilege of transmission;
that measuring the tax by including the value of property gratuitously
'(I926)

75 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 168, 170.

CReed v. Howbert, 8 F. (2d) 641 (D. Colo. 1925); McCaughn v. Girard Trust
Co., ii F. (2d) 520, (C. C. A. 3rd, 1926); Bradley v. Nichols, 13 F. (2d) 857 (D.
Mass.
1926); May v. Heiner, supra note 39.
43
Bradley v. Nichols, supra note 42; Tips v. Bass, 21 F. (2d) 460 (W. D. Tex.
1927).
44(I926) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 168 and following cited cases: Moore v. Bugbee,
3 N. J. Misc. 435, 128 Atl. 679 (1925); People v. Taverner, 300 Ill.
373, 133 N. E.

In the Matter of Green, 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292 (1897). In
the Matter of Cornell, 17o N. Y. 423, 63 N. E. 445 (1902); Dubois' Appeal, 121
211 (1921).

Pa. 368, 15 Atl. 641 (1889); In re Dobson's Estate, 73 Misc. 170, 132 N. Y. Supp.
472 (Surr. Ct. 1911); In re Todd's Estate, 237 Pa. 466, 85 Atl. 845 (r912).
4 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710 (1927). See Frew v. Bowers, 12 F. (2d) 625
(C.6 C. A. 2d, 1926).
4 Supra note 38.
474o STAT. 1057, 1096 (1919).
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transferred long prior to the act, when there could be no question of
an attempted evasion of the act, was arbitrary, whimsical, and capricious, and therefore violated the Fifth Afiendment. The Court was
especially disturbed by the fact that a tax so levied might take all the
property actually transmitted at death and that the valuation of the
gift was to be made not at the time of the transfer but at the time of
death, when its value might have increased many fold. The fact that
at the time of the creation of the trust the conveyance was intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the grantor's
death was not sufficient to make the tax valid. There was no question
of an attempt at evasion of estate taxes as the trust was prior to the
statute. The Court leaves unsettled the question whether the tax is
constitutional with respect to transfers made subsequent to the statute in case a beneficial life interest is retained by the grantor and no
power of revocation is reserved. There is nothing in this case which
would intimate that the provision would not be constitutional as to
trusts created subsequent to the statute, and one may venture to
suggest that the Supreme Court will follow the view generally taken
and hold such a trust should be included in the estate of the grantor
for purposes of the tax.
The next question is if the grantor reserves a power to alter, amend,
or revoke the trust will the trust property be included? When the
grantor reserve's the power to himself alone the question has been settled. It does not matter whether he has reserved a beneficial interest
in himself or not.

Construing

402

C of the Act of

1921,

previously

noted, which is silent as to powers of revocation, the Supreme Court
in a recent case48 held that where property has been transferred during the life of the grantor and the power to alter, amend, or revoke,
has beenreserved to him, that property is tobe included in thegrantor's
estate for the purpose of estimating the estate tax, although the grantor has left the power unexercised. The Court further held that under
the clause "whether such transfer or trust is made or created prior to
or after the passage of the act,"4 9 trusts created prior to 1921 in which
the grantor reserved the right of revocation were to be included in the
gross estate of the grantor for taxing purposes. The Court based its
decision on the ground that a "transfer made subject to a power of revocation in the transferrer terminable at his death is not complete until his death." Since the death occurred after the passage of the Act
the provision was not as to such a case retroactive. This set at rest
any doubts as to the constitutionality of prevailing provisions with
48

Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 3.

,94

STAT. 227 (1921).
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respect to trusts created prior thereto in which the right of revocation
is ieserved to the grantor alone.
Suppose next that the grantor reserves a right to alter, amend, or
revoke the trust in conjunction with a trustee or in conjunction with a
beneficiary. Saltonstall v. Saltonstall,50 a case having to do with a
Massachusetts inheritance or succession tax is of importance in connection with this question. The trust involved was created on
various dates between go5 and 1907. It contained a power of
revocation to be exercised by the grantor in conjunction with one
trustee. At the time of its creation such a trust was not subject
to the tax. The Massachusetts Supreme Court51 construed the
statute in effect at the grantor's death to apply to such a case and
sustained the validity of the tax which had been levied. On errbr
to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts the United States Supreme
Court decided that the tax did not violate the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court called attention to a
difference between the case before it and the case of Nichols v.
Coolidge,52 in that in the latter the matter of a tax upon the privilege of transmitting was involved, while in the former the tax was
a succession tax. In respect to the succession tax the Court says.:m
"So long as the privilege of succession has not been fully
exercised it may be reached by the tax.... And in determining
whether it has been so exercised technical distinctions between
vested remainders and other interests are of little avail, for
the shifting of the economic benefits and buidens of property'
which is the subject of a succession tax may even in the case
of a vested remainder be restricted or suspended by other legal
devices. A power of appointment reserved by the donor leaves
the transfer as to him, incomplete and subject to the tax."
While it is clear from this case that state succession taxes may be
levied on transfers in trust when the power of revocation is reserved
to the grantor in conjunction with a trustee as to trusts created prior
to as well as subsequent to the enactment of a statute which contains
retroactive provisions, the same is not necessarily true as to the federal transfer or estate tax. The Court indicates a possible difference
4
in the treatment in the following language:M
"But we are here concerned, not with a tax on the privilege
of transmission, not with an attempt to tax a donor's estate
5

OSupra note 32.

51

Saltonstall v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 256 Mass. 519, 153 N. E. 4
(1926).
5Supra note 45.
5Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, supra note 32, at 271, 48 Sup. Ct. at 227.
4

Ibid.
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for an absolute gift made when no tax was thought of, and to
do so at the probably appreciated Value which the gift now
bears, but with a tax on the privilege of succession, which also
may constitutionally be subjected to a tax by the state whether
occasioned by death, Stebbins v. Riley, supra,or effected by deed,
Keeneyv. Comptroller, 222 U.S. 525 [32 Sup. Ct. 105 (1912), 38
L.R.A. (N.S.) "i39]; Chanlerv.Kelsey, supra;Nickel v. Cole,supra.
The present tax is not laid on the donor, but on the beneficiary;
the gift taxed is not one long since completed, but one which
never passed to the beneficiaries beyond recall until the death
of the donor; and the value of the gift at that operative moment,
rather than at some later date is the basis of the tax."
In the present revenue acts, 302 takes the place of 402 of prior acts.
the substance of which dates from 1924,5 expressly covers
trusts created in the past in which the power is reserved to the grantor
alone or in conjunction with any one in the following language:
3 02d,

"(d) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise,
where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death
to any change through the exercise of a power, either by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any person, to alter, amend,
or revoke, or where the decedent relinquished any such power in
contemplation of his death, except in case of a bona fide sale
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth."
The courts have not yet passed upon the question whether this provision is constitutional.
In FarmersLoan and Trust Co. v. Bowers, 5 the court refused to
apply 40 C of the Act of 19197 to a trust created in 1916 and modified
in 199 to the extent of rearranging the shares of beneficiaries. In
this trust the grantor had reserved the right to alter, amend, and revoke with the consent of the trustee and had further reserved the
right, as the court below5 8 points out, to remove the trustee.

The

court below stressed this point and stated that there was no probability of the trustee withholding his consent and if he did the grantor
could remove him and get one who would consent. 9 Suchbeingthe
case, that court felt that the case should be treated as though the
grantor had reserved the right in himself to revoke the trust and held
that the value of trust property should be included in estimating the
estate tax of the grantor's estate. The Circuit Court decided other543 STAT. 304 (1925).

F. (2d1) 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
STAT. 1097 (19,9).
5s 5 P. (2d) 706 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
9
" !Tid. 710.
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wise, laying much stress on Nichols v. Coolidge.8" In the light of the
decisions in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company"' and Chase National
Bank v. United States 2which were decided subsequent to this case, one
is inclined to conjecture that the District Court's rather than the Circuit Court's position will be sustained. There was a real power of control here up until the death of the grantor. The following language
of the court in the Chase National Bank case seems applicable:
"Termination of the power of control at the time ofP death inures
to the benefit of him who owns the property subject to the power and
thus brings about, at death, the completion of that shifting of the economic benefits of property which is the real subject of the tax."
Carrying those cases to their logical conclusion the tax should be sustained.
In "four of the trusts involved in Reinecke v. Northern Trust CompanyO life estates were given terminable five years after the death of
the grantor, or on the death of respective life tenants, whichever
should happen first-remainder over to others. The testator reserved
the right "to alter, change or modify the trust," acting jointly with the
beneficiaries. The grantor also reserved the right to supervise investments and others powers of management. The Court held in this
case that the economic interest had shifted and that the reserved
powers did not serve to distinguish these trusts from any other gift
inter vivos not subject to the tax. Stating that there was no explicit
language compelling the tax, the Court applied the principle that
doubt should be resolved in favor of the tax payer. It remains to
be seen whether the Court will treat the estate tax with its present
express provisions as it did the Massachusett's succession tax in
Saltonstall v. Saltonstall.6
There may be a difference in result between the case where the
grantor reserves the right to revoke in conjunction with a trustee and
where in conjunction with the beneficiary. In the latter case there is
nothing if the beneficiary so desires which will keep the property from
coming to him, and the language of Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company would seem to apply:6
"Since the power to revoke or alterwas dependent on the consent of the one entitled to the beneficial and consequently adverse,
interest, the trust, for all practical purposes, had passed as completely from any control by decedent which might inure to his
own benefit as if the gift had been absolute.
"Supra note 45.

61

Supra note 3.

6%78 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126 (1929).
6
Supra note 3.
"Supra note 32.
6Supra note 3, at 346, 49 Sup. Ct. at 125.
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"Nor did the reserved powers of management of the trust
save the decedent of any control over the economic benefits or
the enjoyment of the property. lie would equally have reserved
all these powers and others had he made himself the trustee,
but the transfer would not for that reason have been incomplete.
The shifting of the economic interest in the trust property
which was the subject of the tax was thus complete as soon as
the trust was made. His power to recall the property and of
control over it for his own benefit then ceased and as the trusts
were not made in contemplation of death, the reserved powers
do not serve to distinguish them from any other gift inter vivos
not subject to the tax."
With respect to a gift inter vivos the Supreme Court has recently
decided in Untermeyer v. Anderson" that a tax paid under protest
which was levied upon a gift made before the passage of the act, but
made after it was certain that the act would pass, could be recovered.
The majority reasoned that although the act of Congress so provided,
yet applied retroactively, it violated the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The minority were of the opinion that the act did
not apply. Brandeis strongly dissented. Justices Stone and Holmes
concurring to the view that if the act applied it would be constitutional, pointed out that the view of the majority is a departure from
the view of the Supreme Court, settled for half a century, that a tax
is not bad simply because it is retroactive.
From the previously
quoted language of the Reinecke case and the views of the majority in.
the Untermeyer ease one' might justifiably expect that as to trusts
created prior to the act of 1 9 2 4 in which the right to revoke, etc. rests
in the grantor in conjunction with the beneficiaries, the tax would be
held invalid.
Where the power of revocation is reserved to the grantor in conjunction with a trustee the adverse interest is not necessarily present
and the economic interest has not so completely passed. We have
previously noted 7 that in Saltonstall v. Saltonstall68 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Massachusetts succession tax applied to a trust created before the passage of legislation
upon the subject in which the grantor reserved the power to revoke
in conjuiietion with the trustee.
There is a difference between a succession tax and an estate tax.
The succession tax is levied on the privilege of succession. 9 From the
point of the successor whether he shall enjoy depends on the joint will
6'276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353
142,
48 Sup. Ct. 105 (1927).
67
Supra page 6oi.
'6 Supra note 32.

(1928).

See also Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S.

"9Supra note 34.
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of grantor and trustee. The death of the grantor not having joined with
the trustee in a revocation will serve to fix his rights. The estate tax
is levied on the privilege of transmission.7 0 Looking at the matter,
however, from the point of view of taxing the grantor's estate for the
privilege of transmitting, where the grantor has reserved no right to
remove the trustee, if his trustee is unwilling to join in a revocation,
he may have lost control of the property at the time of the creation of
the trust. It is possible for the Court to hold that Saltonstallv. Saltonstall7' does not apply and reach the result that has just been suggested
might be reached in the case where the power is reserved in conjunction with the beneficiary. The distinction, however, seems without
substantial merit and it is believed that the Saltonstall case should
be followed. Certainly where the power to remove the trustee is
reserved the grantor's power is now in its essence as great as if it
were reserved to himself alone and the property should be subject
to the tax.
As to trusts created subsequent to 3 o2d, there is still some question
as to the constitutionality of the purported tax when the right of
revocation is reserved in conjunction with a beneficiary. While the
Court in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company 72 did say in regard to
such a situation:
"The shifting of the economic interest which was the subject
of the tax was then complete as soon as the trust was made ....
the reserved powers do not serve to distinguish them from
any other gift inter vivos not subject to the tax."
Yet Congress may if it chooses tax other sorts of gifts inter vivos. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York in McNair v.
Anderson 3 held such a tax a direct tax and invalid under Article i,
paragraph 2, clause 3, for want of apportionment. The District Court
of the Western District of Michigan in Blodgett v. Holden 4 took the
opposite view of a tax levied under the same act 5 which was repealed
in 1926. 76 Blodgett v. Holden went up to the Supreme Court of the
United States on certificate by the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Supreme Court 77 held that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover the tax on the ground that the gift had
been made prior to the passage of the statute. Four of the eight
judges sitting considered that the act was not intended to be re7

7
"Supra note 33.
Supra note 32.
"Supra note 3, at 346, 49 Sup. Ct. at 125. Italics are the writers.
nlo F. (2d) 813 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
74ui F. (2d) 18o (W. D. Mich. 1926).
743 STAT. 313 (1924).
7644 STAT. 125 (1926).
7
Blodgett v. Holden, supra note 66.
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'troactive. The other four thought that it was but that so applied it
was unconstitutional. We have already noted the views taken in
.Untermeyerv. Anderson.7 8 The intimation was that the tax was not a
direct tax and therefore not invalid for that reason. In Bromley .
McCaughn"9 the question was squarely presented and the court decided that a gift made subsequent to the act was not invalid as a direct tax not apportioned.8 0 Subsequently created trusts of this type
would seem then to be taxable provided the tax were properlyassessed.
The question remains could Congress measure the tax by the value
of the property at the time of the death of the grantor? In Nichols v.
Coolidge81 we have seen that the Court held that 402C of the Act of
gig was unconstitutional as to an irrevocable trust created prior
to the passage of the act as being arbitrary and capricious and thus
depriving persons of property without due process of law. The Court
laid much stress on the fact that a small gift made years before with
no intent to evade the statutes might have so increased in value that
including the value of that property in that of the grantor for purposes of determining the tax, might leave nothing in the estate for distribution. The same thing might, of course, be true in regard to such
trusts as we are considering created subsequent to the Act. However,
in such a case the donor has warning of what may happen to his
estate. Will that make it less arbitrary? If the transaction was
an absolute completed gift holding up the time of assessing the
tax until the donor's death and estimating the tax which the estate
would have to pay on the value of that property at that time
might still seem to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
Since Congress has seen fit to repeal the tax on gifts inter vivos
it seems that the reason for the provisions in question is largely, if not
entirely, the prevention of evasion of the estate tax. The time for
measuring it would naturally be at the death of the grantor. Further,
since the power to revoke, alter, or amend might be surrendered by
the grantor at any time, it is not until death that we can determine
whether the tax will be due. For these reasons and in view of the
Court's reluctance to declare a tax even when retroactive 8 unconstitutional, it seems altogether probable that as to all trusts created
subsequent to the passage of 302d in which any power of revocation
is reserved, the tax will be upheld.
The grantor, however, may make some reservations. He may re.
78

Supra note 66.

79280 U. S. 124, 50 Sup. Ct. 46 (1929).

"The arguments for and against are set forth in (1926) 74 U. oP PA. L. Rnv.
8
836. See also (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 888.
lSupra note 45.
"See the opinion bf Justice Brandeis in Untermeyer v. Anderson, supra note 66.
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serve powers of management or may make himself the trustee in
which event he will have such powers. To that effect is the previously
quoted language from Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company:"
"Nor did the reserved powers of management of the trusts
save the decedent any control o-er the economic benefits of the
enjoyment of the property. He would equilly have reserved
all these powers and others had he made himself the trustee,
but the transfer would not for that reason have been incomplete.
The shifting of the economic interest in the trust proper which
was the subject of the tax was thus complete as soon as the
trust was made."
Suppose a trust is made in which the grantor reserves to himself
no life estate and no power to alter or amend, but in which an estate
is vested in the beneficiary or beneficiaries which they will not or may
not enjoy in the lay sense of the term until the death of the grantor.
Will such a trust be included in the estate of the grantor for the purpose of the estate tax?
In Shukert v. Allen8 the Court held that trusts in which there was
an accumulation for thirty years, the grantor reserving no interest in
himself and no power of revocation, were not subject to the tax although the beneficiary did come into enjoyment in the lay sense of the
term after the grantor's death. The government was unsuccessful in
its contention "that the trust is in substance and effect testamentary,
because it postpones the ordinary incidents of ownership until the donor's death."" In this case, however, the period was not fixed with
reference to the donor's death, although it probably would not take
place until after the death of the donor. In Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Companym in some of the trusts under consideration beneficial
interests were given to certain life tenants which were terminable
five years after the death of the grantor or on the death of the life tenants, whichever happened first, remainder over. The Court then had to
pass squarely upon the question whether the tax was collectible when
the passage of the possession or enjoyment of the trust fund was fixed
at a time at or after the death of the grantor. The Court held that in
the absence of plain and compelling language a trust inter vivos in
which the power to revoke was reserved in conjunction with the
beneficiary and in which the grantor retained no interest would not
be subject to the estate tax because the gift takes the form of a life
87
estate in one with remainder over at or after the donor's death.
83
Supra note 3, at 346, 49 Sup. Ct. at 125.
8'273 U. S. 545, 47 Sup. Ct. 461 (1927).

85bi. 546, 47 Sup. Ct. at 461.
8
Supra note 3, at 346, 49 Sup. Ct. at 125.
OSupra note 3.
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There remains at least one other important question. If the
grantor arranges the trust so that the property shall be the grantor's
in case the beneficiaries predecease him, shall the property be included
in the gross estate of the grantor for the purpose of the estate tax,
though the beneficixies do not predecease the grantor? In Nichols
v. Bradley8 the grantor' created a trust, one-half the income of
which was to be paid to the grantor's daughters and their issue, and
if the grantor predeceased them, the trust was to continue twenty
years after the death of the last surviving daughter when the corpus
was to be distributed among the issue, but if all the daughters died
without issue during the grantor's life, then the income to the grantor
for life, remainder over. The daughter survived the grantor. The
court held that this trust should not be included in computing the
tax. A similar result was reached in In re Schweinert's Estate89 in connection with the New York Transfer tax. The grantor of the trust
provided that the income should be paid to A for life and on the death
of the grantor the principal to A, but if A predeceased the grantor
then to the grantor absolutely. A survived the grantor. It remains
to be seen what view the United States Supreme Court will take of
such trusts. Will Shukert v. Allen and Reinecke v. Northern Trust
Company be extended to cover them? In the Shukert and Reinecke
cases the estate vested at the time of the creation of the trust and
there was no question of a reversion. In Nichols v. Bradley and in
In re Schweinert's Estate whether the beneficiaries got anything more
than a life income depended on whether they survived the grantor.
Since whether the beneficiaries in such trusts shall get anything more
than the income for life is contingent on whether they outlive the
grantor, it is certainly questionable whether as far as the corpus is
concerned the trusts are not intended to take effect in possession and
enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor. In In re Dunlap's
Estate90 the court took the view that it was so intended where the
grantor having made no express provisions for the emergency there
was a possibility of a reversion on th6 contingency of the death of all
the grantor's daughters without issue during his life. A result contrary to Nichols v. Bradley seems quite possible. The creator of a
F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928).
89133 Misc. 762, 234 N. Y. Supp. 307 (Surr. Ct. 1929). See also In re Kirby,
133 Misc. 152, 231 N. Y. Supp. 4o8 (Surr. Ct. 1928), and In re Bowers, 195 App.
Div. 548, 186 N. Y. Supp. 912 (1st Dept. 1921), aff'd, 231 N. Y. 613, 132 N. E.
8827

910 (1921).
902o5 App.
(1929)

Div. 128, i99 N. Y. Supp. 147 (ist Dept. 1923). See a note in
43 HARV. L. REv. 143, approving the decision in the Matter of Schweinert.
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trust who retains even that slight hold upon the property takes a
chance that the trust will not escape the estate tax.
There has also been a question as to whether one might not by
means of the funded insurance trust escape federal estate taxes. Cati
the grantor set up a trust providing that the income shall be used to
pay the premiums on a policy of insurance in favor of a named beneficiary and reserving the right to change the beneficiary and to alter,
amend, or revoke the trust? There seems no more possibilities in the
device than in the case of ordinary trusts. Chase National Bank v.
United States,9 a companion case to Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, upheld the government's contention that, where the insured
reserved the right to change the beneficiary, the proceeds of the policies in excess of $40,000 were subject to the estate tax, in the following
pertinent language :"Ia
"Such outstanding power residing exclusively in a donor
to recall a gift after it is made is a limitation on the gift which
makes it incomplete as to the donor as well as to the donee,
and we think the termination of such a power at death may
also be the appropriate subject of a tax upon transfers.. . . Termination of the power of control at the time of death inures to
the benefit of him who owns the property subject to the power
and thus brings about at death, the completion of that shifting
of the economic benefits of property which is the real subject of
the tax."
In summary, when the grantor reserves a life estate, it seems probable that the property in trust will be included in the gross estate of
the grantor for the purpose of the Federal Estate Tax. When the
grantor reserves a power of revocation in himself alone, it undoubtedly will be included. And this is true as to all past trust creations,
including funded insurance trusts. Where the power has been reserved to the grantor and the trustee or beneficiary in a trust created
prior to 1924, the matter is still in doubt, especially in the latter case.
As to future creations in such a case there is also a doubt with less
reason however, to hope for successful escape from the tax. When
the grantor has reserved no present beneficial interest in the property
and no powers of revocation, the fact that the beneficiary is to come
into possession in the lay sense at or after his death will not render
the trust property subject to the provisions of the statute. The
1
lb held that the value of property
Supreme Court in May v. Heiner9
9

lSupra note 62.

QaSupra note 62, at 336, 49 Sup. Ct. at 128. Italics are the writers.
sib 5o Sup. Ct. 286 (1930), reversing May v. Heiner, 32 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1929).
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in trust to A for life, then to the grantor for life, remainder over, was
improperly included,

citing Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.Ic,

without adverting to the fact that in that case the grantor had
parted with all the beneficial interest in the property. It therefore
appears possible to create a trust in the property in which the grantor
may enjoy the income for life, remainder over, and escape the imposition of the tax.
There is left a limited field for evasion when the grantor retains no
beneficial interest in himself and no powers of revocation. WZhether
his retention of a reversionary interest, in case the beneficiary of the
trust dies during his lifetime, will make the trust taxable is unsettled.
If the grantor is willing to give up all beneficial interest as well as the
right to revoke, alter, or amend, by maling himself the trustee with
wide powers of management of the trust, which we have noted
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company92 indicates is possible, he may
manage his property as before, and on his death the property, free of
the trust, will be in the hands of his beneficiaries, and will not be included in the valuation of his estate for the purpose of the tax.
In addition as has been pointed out he may in this way minimize his
income taxes as well."
9

1cSupra note 14.

9Supra note 3.
9
Supra page 589.

